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Abstract
This paper focuses on instrument choice while consistently estimating the returns
to education in Vietnam. Using data culled from the 2 rounds of the Vietnam Living
Standards Survey (VLSS), we explore di⁄erent sets of exogenous instruments that
rely on demand and supply side sources of variation in schooling as well as the matrix
of instruments proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981). Instrument validity tests
suggest that many variables do not satisfy the necessary conditions allowing them to
be used as instruments. As in several studies, we ￿nd that IV estimates of the returns
to education are substantially higher than the corresponding OLS estimate. We show
how the Hausman-Taylor matrix of instruments, when combined with other instru-
ments, may be a useful way of consistently estimating an average return to education
rather than a local average treatment e⁄ect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
Keywords: rate of return, instrumental variables procedures, instrument choice, Hausman-
Taylor estimator, Hahn-Hausman test, Vietnam
JEL classi￿cation: J31, I21, C30
￿We thank participants at the IZA European Summer School in Labor Economics, the 53
th Annual
Meeting of the French Economic Association, the 14
th Meeting in Mathematics and Statistics Applied to
Economic Modeling and the development seminar at the University of Auvergne. We are also grateful to
Christopher Grigoriou for useful comments and suggestions.
Corresponding author: B.D￿ Hombres, CERDI, 65 bld Mitterrand, 63000 Clermont-Ferrand, France.
E-mail: B.D_Hombres@u-clermont1.fr
Tel + 33 4 73 17 74 18/Fax + 33 4 73 17 74 28
11 Introduction
Measuring the returns to schooling has been the object of considerable interest in the
empirical labour economics literature.1 In recent years, several new methods have emerged
to deal with di⁄erent biases associated with estimates of the causal impact of education on
earnings. This paper contributes to the debate by (i) using IV estimators in order to obtain
consistent estimates of the returns to education in Vietnam and (ii) exploring the validity
of di⁄erent sets of instruments using various criteria recently proposed in the econometric
literature.
Finding instruments that are orthogonal to the disturbance term in Mincerian wage
equations has been the topic of a great deal of debate: it is widely recognized that it is dif-
￿cult to identify demand-side variation in schooling uncorrelated with individual earnings.
The focus has therefore shifted to supply-side sources of variation in schooling (such as
changes in the minimum school-leaving age, schooling reform or the geographic proximity
of schools) which should allow one to identify exogenous variation in schooling decisions.2
The problem is that the condition that the instruments be strongly correlated with the en-
dogenous variables, a condition that is necessary if one is to avoid the "weak instruments
problem" (leading to ￿nite sample bias), as emphasized by Staiger and Stock (1997), is
often not satis￿ed in studies that rely on supply side variation. When one has panel data,
the generalized instrumental variables procedure proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981,
henceforth HT) constitutes another tool that should allow one to consistently identify
the e⁄ect of time-invariant variables correlated with unobserved individual e⁄ects in the
absence of external instruments.
In this paper, we estimate the returns to education in Vietnam using these di⁄erent
sets of instruments, and a battery of tests is performed in order to test their validity. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst study that takes unobservable heterogeneity into
account in an earnings equation estimated on Vietnamese data. Surprisingly, the panel
nature of the VLSS as well as the wealth of the data available have never been used in an
e⁄ort to obtain consistent estimates of the returns to schooling.3
1See Card (2001) for a review of the literature on this subject.
2Another solution to the endogeneity problem, in the absence of panel data, is to possess a proxy for
ability (as in Griliches (1977) or Boissiere et al (1985)) or twins data (as in Ashenfelter and Zimmerman
(1997), Behrman et al (1994) or Bound and Solon (1999)). The use of twins data causes some problems in
the presence of measurement error on schooling variables and imposes strong assumptions concerning the
measure of ability.
3Note that this paper is the ￿rst study that we are aware of that simulatenously uses these three types
of instruments. Some studies have used two of the sets of instruments we propose: one set based on
demand-side variation and another based on supply-side variation. See for example Callan and Harmon
(1999), Dearden (1999) and Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (1999). See Guillotin and Sevestre (1994) for an
application of the HT instrument set.
2A priori, the transition from a planned to a market economy should lead to an increase
in the returns to schooling insofar as it is expected that wages will be more closely connected
to productivity.4 A number of studies (Moock, Patrinos and Venkataraman, 2003, Nguyen,
2002) have shown, as in the majority of planned economies, that the returns to education in
Vietnam are still low despite the movement towards greater liberalization. One of the goals
of this paper is to ascertain whether this is still the case once one controls for unobservable
individual heterogeneity.5
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses di⁄erent matrices
of instruments with a particular focus on that proposed by HT. Section 3 describes the
data used in the paper and the estimation results. We compare generalized IV results
(GIV) with OLS results and those traditionally obtained on Vietnamese data. Section 4
concludes.
2 "External" versus "internal" instruments
Consider the following earnings equation:6
￿
yit = ￿0 + Xit￿1 + Z1i￿1 + Z2i￿2 + ￿it;..
￿it = fi + "it; i = 1;:::;N; t = 1;:::;T:
; (1)
where Xit is a [NT ￿ K] vector of time-varying explanatory variables and Zi = [Z1i;Z2i]
is a [NT ￿ (G1 + G2)] vector of time-invariant explanatory variables. N is the number of
individuals and T is the number of periods over which they are observed. We assume that
Xit and Z1i are ￿doubly exogenous￿in that they are uncorrelated with the disturbance
term "it and the unobserved individual e⁄ects fi. On the other hand, Z2i is ￿singly ex-
ogenous￿in that it is assumed to be correlated only with the individual e⁄ect. Typically,
Z2i will correspond to years of schooling. In the present context, we ignore all correlation
between the explanatory variables and the error term "it which could stem, for example,
from measurement error in years of completed schooling.7 The preceding assumptions may
then be expressed in formal terms as follows:
4See, among others, Halpern and Krosi (1998), Orazem and Vodopivec (1997) or Rutkowski (1997) for
evidence on the returns to schooling in transition economies.
5However we underline that this article focuses more on the methodology used than on the speci￿cs of
developing countries.
6For the sake of simplicity, we adopt HT￿ s notation throughout the remainder of this paper.
7See Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), Card (2001) or Ashenfelter et al (1999) for summaries of the













Because individual e⁄ects (attributed to innate ability and motivation in our basic
Mincerian wage equation) are unobservable, estimating equation (1) using the pooling
estimator will yield biased estimates of the coe¢ cients. One therefore has to estimate (1)
via IV methods. Using traditional ￿xed e⁄ect methods (such as the within or ￿rst di⁄erence
transformations) is not a viable solution in that, while they allow one to control for fi, they
also sweep out all time-invariant variables, thereby rendering it impossible to identify ￿1
and ￿2: In order to implement an IV procedure, we have to rely on (i) the availability of
external instruments and/or (ii) the matrix of instruments proposed by HT.
2.1 "Traditional" instruments
The usual instrumental variables procedure relies on a matrix of external instruments Wit
of dimension [NT ￿ W] with W > G2 which satis￿es the following conditions:
E[W0
it￿it] = 0; E[W0
itZ2i] 6= 0. (3)
We possess two broad sets of excluded instruments used in the literature.
First, we employ instruments that rely on demand-side variation in schooling
such as parental education and smoking habits. Formally speaking, the ￿rst IV estimator
(IV1) will be based on two variables corresponding to the number of years of education of
individual i￿ s mother and father. More educated parents can assist their children in reaching
higher levels of education. Because of higher wealth, they may also be faced with reduced
liquidity constraints that may otherwise limit their children￿ s educationnal attainment.
Glewwe and Patrinos (1999) highlighted the role played by parental education in terms of
its impact on educational attainment, while Glewwe and Jacoby (2004) underscored that
human capital investment in Vietnam is constrained by household resources. Even if family
characteristics are often considered to be potentially correlated with earnings (thus failing
to satisfy one of the necessary conditions for instrument validity), they are widely used.
In the case of Vietnam, we believe that these instruments should meet the orthogonality
conditions because, under communism, the intergenerational transmission of wealth and
social background only obtained through educational attainment.8
Our second IV (IV2) estimator, also based on demand-side variation in schooling, stems
from heterogeneity in individual discount rates. More speci￿cally, we use information
8Note also that such instruments are not immune from measurement error.
4concerning smoking habits in the past (a dummy variable indicating whether an individual
ever smoked for at least six months) as a predictor of educational attainment.9 As stated
by some authors such as Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003), there are many reasons that
could render this instrument invalid. Note for example that if smoking is a normal good, its
consumption will increase with earnings. Smoking may also be negatively correlated with
education because of heightened awareness concerning the risks involved. This instrument
will therefore be carefully tested so as to check its validity.
The second set of instruments considered relies on supply-side schooling varia-
tion. As in Card (1995) or Malluci (1998) we use the proximity of primary schools and
colleges as instruments, denoted by IV3.10 While these instruments should induce exoge-
nous variations in education, we remain suspicious concerning their relevance.11 As noted
by Bound et al (1995), even if the orthogonality condition is satis￿ed, weak correlation
between the endogenous variable and the set of instruments Wit leads to ￿nite sample bias
in the same direction as the OLS estimate, the magnitude of which depends upon the
correlation between the endogenous variable and the excluded instruments.12
2.2 Hausman Taylor instruments
An alternative to excluded instrumental variables is provided by the HT estimator
(rarely employed in the literature perhaps because of the paucity of panel data) which
provides consistent and e¢ cient estimates of the coe¢ cients ￿2 associated with ￿singly ex-
ogenous￿time-invariant variables Z2i despite the absence of external instruments.13 Their
approach involves using individual-speci￿c means, as well as deviations with respect to the
individual-speci￿c means as instrumental variables. More precisely, the set of instruments
proposed by Hausman-Taylor (1981) is:
9See Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003), Chevalier and Walker (1999) or Evans and Montgomery
(1994)).
10We use a dummy variable indicating if there was a primary school in the village when the concerned
individuals were of school age. Similarly, we use a dummy variable indicating whether there was a secondary
school.
11Other exogenous sources of variation in education have been considered in the literature. The best-
known example is constituted by Angrist and Krueger (1991) in which an individual￿ s quarter of birth (and
interactions with state of birth) are used as instruments. Harmon and Walker (1995, 1999), Ichino and
Winter-Ebmer (1998), Meghir and Palme (1999) and Ferterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) also use exogenous
sources of variation in schooling outcomes.
12For a discussion concerning the properties of IV estimators and ￿nite sample bias, see for example
Nelson and Startz (1990a,b), Buse (1992) or Staiger and Stock (1997). The bias in ￿nite samples is due
to the fact that the coe¢ cients from the reduced form equation are estimated. For an excellent survey
concerning the weak instruments problem, its consequences and potential solutions, see Stock et al (2002)
or Hahn and Hausman (2003).
13See Hausman and Taylor (1981) for an application of this estimator to the returns to schooling.
5AHT = [QvXit;PvXit;Z1i]; (4)
where Pv and Qv are the idempotent matrices that perform the between and within trans-
formations respectively. The basic intuition behind the HT estimator is that only the
fi component of the error term is correlated with Z2i, which allows one to decompose





under the assumptions given in (2). The HT estimator therefore allows one to control for
unobservable correlated individual e⁄ects, while identifying the parameter of interest (￿2)
in our Mincerian equation. A necessary condition for identi￿cation is that the number
of elements of Xit be greater than the number of elements of Z2i.14 This IV approach is
an ingenious manner of arti￿cially multiplying the number of available instruments and
thereby side-stepping the identi￿cation issue. This matrix of instruments will be denoted
by IV4.
To take into account the composite structure of our stochastic error term, since ￿ =
￿2
fITN + ￿2
"JTN (where ITN = IN ￿ IT and JTN = IN ￿ JT with JT a T ￿ T matrix
of ones), and to obtain a more e¢ cient estimator, a generalized IV estimator (GIV) is
implemented.15
14Note that we could decompose Xit into Xit = [X1it;X2it] where Xit is a [NT ￿ (K1 + K2)] vector
of time-varying explanatory variables and X1it is assumed to be ￿doubly exogenous￿while X2it is ￿singly
exogenous￿ . In this case, the matrix of instruments proposed by HT is AHT = [QvXit;PvX1it;Z1i]: A
necessary condition for identi￿cation is then that K1>G2. These results have been extended by Amemiya
and McCurdy (1986) and Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt (1989) who suggest the wider set of instruments
given respectively by AAM = [QvXit;X
￿




a (1 ￿ TK1) vector where X1it stands for X1 in each period. The Amemiya-McCurdy instrument set
assumes that the doubly exogenous variables are uncorrelated with the individual e⁄ects in each period.
The Breusch-Mizon-Schmidt instrument set assumes that these correlations are the same in each period.
Their approach requires one to have a panel data set where T > 2. If one only has two periods, as we do,
their matrix of instruments is the same as that proposed by Hausman and Taylor.
15Equation (1) is premultiplied by ￿
￿1=2 which, as indicated by Hausman (1978), is equal to :
￿










Formally speaking, we use a two-step procedure so as to obtain consistent estimates of ￿ and then of
￿: The matrix of instruments is applied to equation (1) yielding a consistent estimate of the vector of
coe¢ cients. The residuals are then used in order to carry out the transformations allowing one to obtain




f: Finally equation (1) is transformed by ￿
￿1=2and one applies 2SLS on the
transformed equation using the matrix of instruments under consideration. As noted in Wooldridge (2002),
if ￿ is not random, other variance-covariance matrices should be considered since they would potentially
produce more e¢ cient estimates. Our program is available upon request.
63 Empirical Results
3.1 Data
The data is derived from two waves of the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys (VLSS)
household survey collected by the General Statistical O¢ ce of Vietnam with the assistance
of the World Bank. The ￿rst survey was undertaken in 1992 ￿ 93 and the second in
1997￿98. The panel structure of the VLSS allows us to track 324 wage-earning males over
the period 1992 ￿ 1998. Only males were retained in order to avoid issues of labor market
participation. Table 1 reports the sample statistics associated with the relevant variables.
Table 1: Summary statistics
1993 ￿ 1997
Number of observations 648
Age: mean 30:22
(11:15)
Hourly earnings (in thousand Dong) 2:51
(2:64)
Years of completed schooling 8:43
(4:12)
Region of residence: North(%) 40:12
Urban Area (%) 39:35
Ethnic group (%): Kinh + Chinese 93:51
Public sector (%) 40:74
Instruments
Mother￿ s Education 2:97
(3:14)
Father￿ s Education 5:29
(4:08)
Smoking Habits (% having ever smoked) 67:59
Proximity of a primary school 0:663
Proximity of a secondary school 0:519
Standard errors in parentheses.
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly wage of an individual￿ s main job
in the week prior to the survey.16 It includes all reported wages, bonuses, work subsidies,
and income in kind. It is equal on average to 1:46 and 3:56 thousand Dongs (VSD) in
16We are conscious of the fact that most Vietnamese work in agriculture or are self-employed. This
explains why a sizable portion of the work force is dropped from our sample. However, the transition from
a planned to a market economy involves an expansion of wage employment and it is thus of great interest
to identify those forces driving wage growth.
71992 ￿ 93 and 1997 ￿ 98, respectively.17 Accounting for an in￿ ation rate of 8% per year
between the two surveys, this represents an increase in real terms of 10:7% per year. This
performance of the wage sector can be compared to an average growth rate of real GDP
per capita of 6:5% during the same period. These numbers illustrate the success of the
liberalization movement (Doi Moi) implemented in the late 1980s.
Our measure of education is the highest year of education completed by the individual.18
Note that this measure of education is not the actual number of years spent at school
allowing us to account for grade repetition. The average level is 8:43 years over our sample.
This is very high for a low income country such as Vietnam. Moreover, only 5% of our
sample has no education while 60% and 30% ￿nished lower and upper secondary school,
respectively. These ￿gures highlight the importance ascribed to in education in Vietnam,
as compared with other countries having a similar GDP per capita (411$ in 2001). Roughly
40% of our sample lives in northern Vietnam. The relative importance of the public sector
remained stable between the two surveys, representing about 40% of wage employment.
All estimates of the returns to schooling presented below are taken from a basic Min-
cerian wage equation that links the log of wages to years of schooling. Control variables
include age, age squared, a regional dummy (north versus south), an urban area dummy, an
occupational dummy (public versus private sector), an ethnic dummy and a time dummy.
The ethnic minority dummy has been introduced in order to control for inequality between
the two main economic groups (Kinh and Chinese) and other minority groups (see Van de
Walle and Gunewardena 2001 and Baulch and Minot 2002).19 We have also included a
public sector dummy so as to control for the remaining e⁄ect of the old public sector wage
structure.
Table 2 displays OLS and IV estimates of the returns to schooling.20 The OLS results
give a rate of return to education of 2:6%. In comparison, using the 1992 ￿ 93 VLSS,
Moock et al (2003) found, for male workers, an average return of 3:4%. Similarly, Nguyen
(2002) obtained returns to education of 3:1% and 3:9%, using respectively the 1992 ￿ 93
VLSS and the 1997￿98 VLSS data. Our lower OLS estimate can be explained either by the
use of a more complete speci￿cation or by the exclusion of women from our sample in order
to avoid sample selection issues. In all cases, these numbers are extremely low compared
to those typically obtained in developing countries. It has been shown that returns to
171 USD was exchanged for about 10 000 VSD in 1993 and 13 000 VSD in 1997.
18The Vietnamese educational system is composed of general, vocational and higher education (univer-
sities and colleges). General education includes primary school (5 years), lower secondary school (4 years),
and upper secondary school (3 years). There are vocational schools after each of these levels.
19However, as stated by these authors, the main source of ethnic inequality stems more from an unequal
distribution of endowments - particularly in terms of geographical concentration in poorer areas - than from
a pure discrimination e⁄ect.
20The complete results are presented in Table A:4 of the Appendix.
8Table 2: Return to education
OLS IV1 IV4 IV1 + IV4















Partial R2 n:a: 0:13 0:058 0:176
Number of excluded instruments n:a: 2 5 7
Hahn-Hausman-m1 n:a: ￿0:027 ￿0:072 ￿0:082
Hahn-Hausman-m2 n:a: ￿0:000 0:678 1:085
Donald-Newey MSE test n:a: 2:354 16:458 1:382
￿ 0:64 0:65 0:61 0:62
R
2 0:43 0:41 0:44 0:43
Sets of instruments used : IV1 : Parent￿ s education, IV2 : Smoking habits,
IV3 : School proximity, IV4 : HT set of instruments.
P-values in parentheses.
schooling are usually low in transition economies but tend to increase as economic reforms
deepen. For example, Maurer-Fazio (2002) found an average return of 2:9% and 3:7% in
China for male workers in 1989 and 1992.21 This phenomenon can be explained by the
persistence of the egalitarian wage structure of the pre-reform period. More speci￿cally,
in the case of Vietnam, restrictions on worker mobility allow enterprises to underpay their
workers compared to their marginal productivity.22 Thus, if the gap between the wage and
marginal productivity is larger for educated workers, returns to education will be low by
construction23 Note that we also tested a speci￿cation in which education was interacted
with time (column 2, Table A.2). No evidence emerged indicating the the returns to
education have signi￿cantly increased over time. This may be because wages increased
uniformly across the schooling distribution. In the remainder of the paper, we therefore
focus on the more restrictive speci￿cation in which the returns to education are constant
over time.
3.2 IV estimates
21See also Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) and Varga (1995) for studies on the returns to education in
China, Slovenia and Hungary.
22See Guest (1998).
23Using data on rural enterprises, Fleisher and Wang (2004) provided evidence that this gap was relatively
larger for skilled workers than for production workers in China.
9In our attempt to correct for the potential endogeneity of schooling, we implemented
the IV estimators proposed above. However, as a preliminary step, we carried out three
sets of tests concerning the validity and relevance of our proposed instruments.
3.2.1 Instrument orthogonality
We ￿rst rely on the traditional Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions
(which tests the orthogonality of the instruments) despite the fact that this test is now
well-known to be potentially inconclusive. This is because the Hansen test is based on the
hypothesis that at least one instrument in each instrument set is exogenous (Wooldridge
2002). Moreover, its power is particularly low in the presence of weak instruments (Baum,
Scha⁄er, and Stillman 2003). Adding weak instruments may lead one not to reject the null
hypothesis of orthogonality just by increasing degrees of freedom (Sevestre 2002).
In order to take this weakness of the Hansen test into account, our strategy consisted
in (i) repeating the test using various combinations of instruments and (ii) implementing
the "Difference-Hansen test" so as to check the validity of subsets of instruments (see
Hayashi 2000). This last statistic is simply the di⁄erence between two Hansen statistics,
the ￿rst statistic being that computed from the restricted model which uses only the "non-
suspect" instruments while the second is that associated with the unrestricted speci￿cation
which includes the instruments "under suspicion".
The ￿rst four rows of table A:1 in the Appendix present results of overidenti￿cation tests
on the four instrument sets proposed above. In all cases, the overidentifying restrictions are
not rejected. However, these results may be misleading as our various sets of instruments
are by de￿nition homogeneous. Thus, for example, if the father￿ s education were to fail the
Hansen test, one should expect the same to obtain for the mother￿ s education. Moreover,
because it is just identi￿ed, we cannot test the orthogonality of our second set of instruments
(smoking habits), as noted in row 2 of table A:1. Rows 5 to 14 present Hansen tests on
a large number of possible combinations of instruments. From row 5 to row 8; we use
di⁄erent combinations of IV1, IV2 and IV3; while rows 9 to 14 systematically include the
matrix of instruments proposed by HT (IV4). As with the Hansen tests on each set of
instruments individually, these results would lead one not to reject. It is interesting to
note, however, that while the p-values associated with the various Hansen tests never fall
below 20%, inclusion of IV 2 and IV 3 always reduces the p-value associated with the test.
We next implemented the Di⁄erence-Hansen test. Our suspicions concerning IV2 and
IV3 were then con￿rmed. As shown in table A:1, when the subsets of instruments being
tested are those related to school proximity and individual discount rates (IV2 and IV3),
the null hypothesis that these instruments are valid is marginally rejected (see rows 5;6; 7
and 10 to 14). This leads us to be cautious concerning the validity of these instrument sets,
10and to lean towards dropping them in our attempt to consistently estimate the returns to
schooling in Vietnam. By contrast, as shown in rows 8 and 9, parental education appears
once again to be strongly exogenous. This con￿rms our expectations concerning returns
to education and the intergenerational transmission of human capital in Vietnam. Private
returns to schooling under communism are usually held to have been non-existent. Note
that IV 4 also passes the Hansen test.
3.2.2 Instruments relevance
In order to address concerns about the weakness of our instruments, we then carried
out the partial F-test of the joint signi￿cance of the instruments and calculated the partial
R2; for the ￿rst stage regressions.24 Results are reported in the last two columns of Table
A:1 and suggest that IV2 (smoking habits), IV3 (school proximity) and IV4 (HT) are not
su¢ ciently correlated with schooling (rows 2, 3 and 4). As shown by Staiger and Stock
(1997), and even in the presence of a very large data set, an F-statistic below 10 when there
is a single endogenous regressor means that one is potentially facing a weak instruments
problem.25 While we did not reject their orthogonality on the basis of the Hansen or Di⁄-
Hansen tests, the F-test size leads one to be very cautious concerning IV4. On the other
hand, there is a strong correlation between schooling and parental education, as illustrated
by a partial R2 of 13% and an F-statistic of 47:9 (row 1). When we combine IV1 and IV4,
the partial R2 rises to 17% (row 9). This shows that adding the HT matrix of instruments
can potentially improve the e¢ ciency of more traditional IV methods based on excluded
demand side instruments. Note that when we combine IV1 with IV2 or IV3 the hypothesis
of weak instruments is also rejected. However, as shown earlier, IV2 and IV3 may not
satisfy the orthogonality condition, leading us to consider their combination with IV1 as
inadmissible. As a consequence of these ￿ndings, we are led to focus our attention, in what
follows, on IV1; IV4 and IV14.
Another way of evaluating the relevance of our instruments involved implementing the
Hahn-Hausman specification test (2002).26 In contrast to the partial R2 and F-
statistics which test the null hypothesis of "weak" instruments, the Hahn Hausman test
(henceforth HH) is based upon the null of "strong" instruments.27 This test is constructed
24This means that we compute the F-test and the R
2 of the reduced form once the other covariates have
been partialled out.
25More precisely, from table 1 presented in Stock and Yogo (2002, p. 522), given the partial F-test size
and the number of excluded instruments, we can infer that the 2SLS bias will probably exceed 10% with
IV2; IV3 and IV4.
26To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the ￿rst empirical uses of this test. Our program is available
upon request.
27To be precise, the Hahn Hausman test is a joint test of the orthogonality and relevance of the in-
struments. However, as in the empirical example in Hahn and Hausman (2002), we apply this test to
instruments which pass a ￿rst screening in terms of the test of the overidentifying restrictions.
11by running the 2SLS regression in its usual "forward" form, and comparing the result to
that obtained by running the "reverse" regression, in which the jointly endogenous right-
hand-side (RHS) variable is moved to the LHS, and the dependent variable is entered on
the RHS.28 The basis for their ￿rst test (m1) is that, if the speci￿cation is correct and
the instruments are "strong", standard ￿rst-order asymptotics imply that there will be very
little di⁄erence between the results one obtains using the forward or reverse regressions.29
Things are complicated somewhat because of the need to adjust for second-order bias in
the estimators, and the test is standardized by using a second-order expression for the
variance of the di⁄erence between the forward and reverse estimators.
The test, which can be read as simple t-statistic, is presented in Table A:2. The null
hypothesis of strong instruments is clearly not rejected for IV1, IV4 and the combination
of both (IV14). We also implemented another version of the test which involves use of the
forward and reverse bias-adjusted 2SLS (Nagar) estimator proposed by Donald and Newey
(2001). As stated by Hahn and Hausman, this test is somewhat simpler to implement
because of the absence of the (second-order) bias term. Here, the m2 statistic based on
the Nagar estimator does not reject IV1; IV4:or IV14: Note also that the point estimate of
the returns to education is remarkably stable whatever estimator is used (forward 2SLS,
reverse 2SLS, forward bias-adjusted 2SLS, reverse bias-adjusted 2SLS).
3.2.3 Instrument choice
As a ￿nal set of diagnostics, and in order to single out one instrument set as our preferred
choice (among IV1, IV4 or IV14), we carried out the Donald and Newey (2001) "choice
of instruments" test. The Donald and Newey test is based upon choosing, from within
a number of valid instrument sets, the one which minimizes the mean-squared error (MSE)
of each estimator.30 As can be seen in the ￿rst column of the table A:3, IV14 minimizes
the MSE of all three estimators. The conclusion, on the basis of the Donald and Newey
test, is that IV14 is the preferred instrument set, whether one uses 2SLS, Nagar or LIML.
28For example, in the wage regressions we consider here, the reverse regression involves putting educational
attainment on the left and log wage on the right, with the position of the included predetermined variables
remaining unchanged.
29See Hahn and Hausman (2002).
30In the ￿rst stage of the test procedure, one identi￿es the instrument set that minimizes the Mallows or
Cross-Validation reduced form goodness of ￿t criterion. This instrument set is then used to compute initial
estimates of the variance of the reduced form and structural equation residuals, as well as their covariance,
which enter into the expressions for the Mallows (and Cross-Validation criterion ) criterion and the MSEs.
In the second stage of the procedure, one recomputes the Mallows criterion (or the Cross-Validation ), for
each instrument set. This is then plugged into the appropriate expression for the MSE of each estimator
(see Donald and Newey, 2001, pp. 1164-5), which itself depends upon the choice of instrument set. The
instrument set which minimizes the MSE is then the one that should be used with the corresponding
estimator.
12The upshot of these procedures is that, despite having various matrices of instruments
at our disposal, few are able to satisfy the two conditions that are necessary for them to be
admissible. A sequence of test procedures led us to settle on IV1;IV4 and IV14 as being
the best potential candidates, with a marginal preference, based on the Donald and Newey
choice of instruments test, for IV14:
3.2.4 IV estimates
As in most studies of the returns to education, we obtain IV estimates that are sub-
stantially higher than the corresponding OLS estimate. Using IV1, the estimated return
to education increases to 7% (from 2:6% using OLS), while using the matrix of instruments
proposed by HT (column 2) yields an estimated return of 5:1%, though it is estimated less
precisely. The speci￿cation using a combination of IV1 and IV4 (reported in column 4 )
gives a point estimate of 0:065 which lies between the ￿gures estimated with IV1 and IV4
alone.
Given that the correlation between unobservable heterogeneity (such as innate ability)
and educational attainment is likely to be positive, the OLS estimate should be biased
upwards. Card (1999), Bound and Jaeger (1996) and Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (1999)
have proposed an explanation for this phenomenon that is based on the hypothesis that
the returns to schooling are heterogeneously distributed across the population.31 This
heterogeneity may appear at two levels.
First, it is likely that the marginal returns to education are decreasing in the level of
schooling. Thus, if parental education mainly in￿ uences the educational choice of individ-
uals at the lower end of the distribution of schooling, IV procedures will yield a return
that is higher than it should be in the population as a whole.32 Second, for a given level
of education, parental education will potentially a⁄ect educational choice (i) for more able
individuals (educated parents will more easily spot abler children and encourage them to
pursue their studies) and/or (ii) individuals with high discount rates (due for example to
low taste for education).33
In short, heterogeneity in the returns to education implies that IV estimates will pro-
duce di⁄erent results that are functions of the set of instruments used, the di⁄erence
31Note that several other explanations have been suggested. In particular, Griliches (1977) and An-
grist and Krueger (1991) pointed out the potential downward bias caused by measurement error in OLS.
However, it is now well-known that the magnitude of the error required to explain the observed di⁄erences
between OLS and IV estimates is much larger than what had previously been established in the litterature.
Ashenfelter et al (1999) also furnished an explanation in terms of publication bias.
32See Card (2001).
33In a constrained situation, parents will choose to ￿nance more skilled children.
13stemming from which subpopulation is most a⁄ected by the instruments in question. The
weighted marginal return we estimate is akin to what Imbens and Angrist (1994) called
a local average treatment e⁄ect (LATE).34 We believe that this phenomenon explains why
our IV estimates exceed the OLS estimate.
Combining IV1 with IV4 (HT) should produce an estimated return closer to the true
average return insofar as the instruments used in the HT procedure should in￿ uence educa-
tional decisions more uniformly through the distribution of schooling. This would appear
to be con￿rmed by the results reported in column 4 of Table 2 where the point estimate
is slightly lower than what is obtained using IV1 alone. While the HT procedure may not
allow one to precisely identify the average return to education, we believe that it does o⁄set
the e⁄ect of instruments that are only correlated with part of the distribution of schooling.
Combining demand side (IV1) and HT (IV4) instruments may therefore constitute a good
compromise solution, especially here, where the instruments in question are not rejected
by a succession of tests designed to assess their exogeneity, relevance, and performance in
terms of the mean-squared error or information criteria of the resulting estimators.35
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the economic returns to education in Vietnam using a
panel data set. We used the instrumental variables procedure proposed by Hausman and
Taylor (1981), as well as various matrices of instruments commonly used in the literature.
A series of tests led us to conclude that few instrumental variables met the two conditions
necessary for them to be admissible. In the case of Vietnam, only parental education
and the matrix of instruments proposed by HT satisfy the two usual requirements. When
the endogeneity of schooling is taken into account, the return to an additional year of
schooling increases substantially: in line with international evidence, we ￿nd that OLS
under-estimates the returns to schooling. As has been suggested by a number of authors,
we believe that we are potentially facing a local average treatment e⁄ect (LATE) problem,
which the HT matrix of instruments can partly help one to solve.
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19A Appendix
A.1 Validity and relevance of our instruments
Excluded Hansen Di⁄-Hansen Subset of instruments Partial F-test
instruments test test tested R2
1 IV1 0:000
(0:99)
n:a: n:a: 0:131 47:9
(0:000)






































































Sets of instruments used : IV1; Parent￿ s education, IV2 : Smoking habits,
IV3 : School proximity, IV4 : HT set of instruments.
P-values in parentheses.
20A.2 The Hahn Hausman (2002) test

























Hahn-Hausman m1 test statistic ￿0:027 ￿0:072 ￿0:082
Hahn-Hausman m2 test statistic ￿0:000 0:678 1:085
Standard errors in parentheses. When the number of instruments is
equal to 2, the B2SLS estimator (reverse B2SLS) boils down
to the 2SLS estimator (2SLS reverse).
A.3 The Donald and Newey (2001) instrument selection criteria
Instrument set Mallows criterion MSE of estimator
on reduced form based on b Rm
b Rm b S2SLS b SB2SLS b SLIML
IV1 5:732 2:354 2:415 2:416
IV4 39:338 16:458 16:595 16:562
IV14 3:288 1:271 1:382 1:389
Cross-validation criterion MSE of estimator
on reduced form based on b Rcv
b Rcv b S2SLS b SB2SLS b SLIML
IV1 5:800 2:383 2:444 2:445
IV4 40:788 17:067 17:207 17:172
IV14 3:284 1:270 1:380 1:388
21A.4 Returns to education in Vietnam
OLS OLS IV1 IV4 IV1+IV4
Coe¢ cient



































































































Partial R2 (excluded instruments) n:a: n:a: 0:131 0:058 0:176
F on excluded instruments n:a: n:a: 47:90 7:30 17:60
Number of excluded instruments n:a: n:a: 2 5 7
Hahn-Hausman-m1 n:a: n:a: ￿0:027 ￿0:072 ￿0:082
Hahn-Hausman-m2 n:a: n:a: ￿0:000 0:678 1:085
￿ 0:64 0:64 0:65 0:61 0:62
R
2 0:43 0:42 0:41 0:44 0:43
Number of observations 648 648 648 648 648
P-values are in parentheses.
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